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Abstract: This paper addresses the relationship between norms of reasoning and norms of politeness: To what
extend can one be polite and reasonable at the same time? For this purpose, a normative system of reasoning (i.e. the
model of the pragma-dialectical critical discussion) is contrasted with normative systems of politeness (Leech’s
Politeness Maxims and Brown/Levinson’s FTA avoidance). If and when they are in conflict: How can the
communicator solve this tension?
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1. Introduction
In his landmark work on politeness theory Geoffrey Leech presents two formulations of his
politeness principle: “Minimize (other things being equal) the expression of impolite beliefs” and
“Maximize (other things being equal) the expression of polite beliefs” (Leech 1983, p. 81;
similarly, Leech 2014, p. 35; pp. 90ff.). He goes on to divide this principle into six (1983
version) respectively ten (2007/2014 version) maxims that explain how one achieves the
maximization or minimization of these expressions.
In this paper I will take a closer look at the too easily disregarded ceteris paribus clause
that opens Leeches definition of the politeness principle and that – explicitly or implicitly –
underlies a large number of other communicative imperatives. Everything else being equal,
communicators are well advised in following a large number of communicative principles or
maxims: Be polite! – Reduce the threat to other people’s face, and maintain communicative
concord. Be funny! – Bring happiness and mirth to people, take tragedy out of human life and
help us see underappreciated connections in language and life. Be flirtatious! – Fulfill your
desires in life, find love and partnership and ultimately even foster evolutionary goals. Be ironic!
– Take some of the dullness out of proper communication, and stimulate thinking and
conversations by making language less binary. Be reasonable! – Maximize the likelihood to
resolve differences of opinion on their merits, and reach lasting agreement on standpoints. Be
persuasive! – Get your will, succeed and lead people in the direction you know or believe to be
advantageous. The list goes on.
Taken individually each of these imperatives has a lot to commend itself. But what
happens when things aren’t equal and two or more of these imperatives clash? Some of the
problems that can arise out of the tension or interaction between the guiding imperatives (and the
academic disciplines that tag along with them: politeness theory, humor studies, courtship
studies, stylistics, dialectics, rhetoric) have already received ample scholarly attention. This is
particularly true for example for the interaction between humor and politeness or courtship and
humor (e.g. Dynel 2016; Haugh 2011; Holmes and Schnurr 2005; Matthews, Hancock and
Dunham 2006). Conflicts involving norms of reasonableness seem to have received less attention
Bondy, P., & Benacquista, L. (Eds.). Argumentation, Objectivity, and Bias: Proceedings of the 11 th International
Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 18-21 May 2016. Windsor, ON: OSSA,
pp. 1-16.
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– with one exception: The tension arising between norms of reasonableness as understood by the
pragma-dialectical school and the rhetorical aim to be persuasive has been studied at great length
and with impressive attention to detail (albeit mainly from a dialectical perspective) under the
heading of “strategic maneuvering” (van Eemeren 2010; van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002a;
van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002b). In this paper I will focus mainly on a different potential
conflict: That between norms of politeness and norms of reasonableness. Simply put: Is it
reasonable to be polite?1 Or, is it polite to be reasonable? Alternatively, and slightly more
technically: Under what conditions can norms of politeness and norms of reasonableness
conflict, and what options do individual communicators have to avoid, minimize or resolve these
conflicts? For the purposes of this paper I will use the ten commandments of the pragmadialectical school, as a representative formulation of the rules of communicative reasonableness,
and Leech’s ten maxims as their counterpart for communicative politeness.
Unfortunately, the nature of communicative rules, norms, imperatives and maxims is
highly ambiguous.2 I have no intention of making a meaningful contribution to a general theory
of normativity in communication (or even to give an overview over existing theories) at this
time, but I believe that some working definitions of the different kinds of communicative rules
are required for the purposes if this paper. Similarly, a number of preliminary remarks on the
choice of rules are in order to avoid misunderstandings. From this follows the structure of the
body of this paper. In the first part I will address the methodological framework, including the
different levels of rules in communication, and explain the choice of Leech’s model and the
pragma-dialectical model for the purposes of this study. In part two I will draw attention to the
different modes of interaction of competing communicative imperatives in general. Part three is
focused on areas of potential conflict of the specific sets of communicative imperatives
(politeness and reasonableness) at hand. Finally, in part four I will address strategies or options
of dealing with inter-norm conflict where it arises.
2. Rules in communication
The status of different kinds of communicative rules continues to be a rich source of criticism
and misunderstanding. To avoid some of these in this paper I will introduce a working definition
of three levels of rules in communicative disciplines. Each of these working definitions will be
open to a variety of theoretical objections and they leave a large grey area between them, but I
believe the resulting terminology will be of use for the discussion of politeness and
reasonableness below.
Authors in politeness theory, argumentation theory, and related disciplines, frequently
refer to one of three (different, but interrelated and overlapping) phenomena when using
language that involves “rules” and related terms (“norms”, “maxims”, “principles”,
“imperatives”): 1. Normal behavior, 2. Strategic advice, and 3. Constitutive norms. In this paper
I will refer to them as level 1 rules, level 2 rules and level 3 rules:

1

This question is almost identical to the title of a 1993 paper, but the author takes it into a very different direction
(Kingwell 1993).
2
Leech’s model of politeness gives a particularly good illustration of the perceived problems of the term “maxim”.
After introducing six maxims in his 1983 model (Leech 1983, pp. 131ff.), Leech is repeatedly criticized for the
prescriptive nature they imply, to a point that he eliminates the term in his 2007 version of the model, substituting it
by “constraint” (Leech 2007, p. 182). In 2014 he returns to “maxim” acknowledging the problem, but realizing that
there is no easy alternative. (Leech 2014, p. 85)
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Level 1 rules describe recurring or normal communicative behavior. It could be argued
that using normative langue for phenomena of this kind is a mistake in the first place, but if so, it
is a frequently recurring mistake. Some rules of societal etiquette fall under these groups of rules,
as well as for example, dress codes (in western societies women tend to wear skirts more
frequently than men do) or rules of ritualized communication.
Level 2 rules give strategic advice to communicators who strive for a particular goal.
Most rhetorical rules are of this nature. The key quality of these rules is their dependence on a
higher objective.3 The communicator will often be well advised to follow these rules, but is also
at liberty to reach his or her objective while violating these rules without any consequence for the
overarching goal.
Level 3 rules are absolute norms, that are not strategically goal-dependent and define the
communicative activity. Breaking these rules makes achieving their constitutive aim impossible.4
Accordingly, communicators are expected to follow these rules while looking for strategies to
achieve their objective, rather than considering these rules a general advice that can be
overridden by better strategies in a given case.
The purpose of distinguishing between these levels is not an attempt to create watertight
categories for communicative rules, but rather to clarify the vocabulary for some necessary
distinctions here. Linking a particular set of rules to either of the above levels is frequently
anything but trivial. Two examples that are closely relevant for the present paper can be used to
illustrate this: 1. Grice’s Cooperative Principle including his four maxims (Grice 1975) that is of
central importance for early models of politeness (e.g. Lakoff 1973; Brown and Levinson 1978;
Brown and Levinson 1987; Leech 1983), and 2. the pragma-dialectical model of a critical
discussion.
Grice’s famous cooperative principle is a particularly interesting case in point regarding
levels of rules. It has been so frequently misinterpreted as a set of level 2 rules for effective
communication, or even as a set of level 3 rules of ethical principles of communication.
Admittedly, Grice is probably partially to blame for some of these misunderstandings. His
formulation of the principle as an imperative (“Make your conversational contribution such as is
required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk
exchange in which you are engaged.” 1975, p. 45), his explicit reference to Kant (1975, p. 45),
and his wording of the “maxims”, all might lead some readers to infer that they are dealing with
level 2 or level 3 rules. It takes a closer reading to catch the explicit clarifications in Grice that
the cooperative principle and its maxims are indeed an example of level 1 rules. He writes
“These analogies are relevant to what I regard as a fundamental question about the CP and its
attendant maxims, […], that talkers will in general (ceteris paribus and in the absence of
indications to the contrary) proceed in the manner that these principles prescribe.” (Grice 1975,
pp. 47f.). The cooperative principle thus describes how communicators usually do act, not how
they should act.5 And after all, this descriptive nature of the cooperative principle is what gives it
its considerable value for the reconstruction of unexpressed premises in argumentative discourse.
In Kant’s terminology these are hypothetical imperatives (Kant 2012, 414:4ff.). While I do not think that his
distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives is useful for the present purposes, some of the
distinctions overlap.
4
These rules largely coincide with Searle’s description of “constitutive rules” (Searle 1969, pp. 33-41), while his
“regulative rules” do not neatly fit into the present distinctions. Risking a certain amount of oversimplification one
could also draw a parallel from the ethical realm between level 2 utilitarian rules and level 3 deontological rules.
5
In Leech’s words, who also provides one of the most eloquent and concise discussions of the misunderstanding
(Leech 2014, pp. 310-313) “It was the logic of conversation, not the ethics of conversation, that interested [Grice].”
3
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Given that Leech explicitly postulates a parallel rank of his politeness principle and maxims to
Grice’s cooperative principle and maxims, understanding Grice as a level 1 example will become
relevant below again.
The second case in point, the pragma-dialectical rules for a critical discussion are even
harder to grasp in terms of their level of communicative rules. It is of course impossible to do
full justice to a model that has triggered hundreds (if not thousands) of books and articles
discussing its details. However, for the present purposes a brief discussion of the location of its
rules on the outlined scale is essential, because it influences the way in which they can conflict
with other sets of rules. The representative formulation for the present purpose is the “code of
conduct for reasonable discussants” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, pp. 187-196). At first
glance there are a couple of indicators in favor of treating the “ten commandments for reasonable
discussants” as a set of level 3 rules. First, the name itself and its (tongue in cheek) reference to
the single most famous level 3 rules in western civilization could be taken as an indicator of its
kind.6 Second, and more importantly, the wording of the commandments themselves suggest a
categorical nature. Finally, the fact that the communicative activity itself (the critical discussion)
is defined by the adherence to the rules, and that any violation is treated as an (objectionable)
fallacy (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, p. 22; van Eemeren et al. 2014, pp. 544ff.) points
towards the constitutive nature of these rules. There are however stronger indicators for
understanding the pragma-dialectical rules as a kind of goal-dependent strategic advice. Van
Eemeren and his collaborators make it redundantly clear that they consider the pragmadialectical rules as instrumental for the resolution of a difference of opinion on its merits, or to
“play the game effectively, and they are to be judged for their capacity to serve this purpose well
[…] (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, p. 187), a quality that they call “problem validity”
(van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, p. 17, p. 22, p. 57, p. 132, p. 134, p. 187; van Eemeren
2015, pp. 129ff.; van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2015b, pp. 164ff.; van Eemeren, Garssen and
Meuffels 2009, pp. 20ff; van Eemeren et al. 2014, pp. 192ff. and 527ff.). The kind of
instrumentality found in the pragma-dialectical rules is quite different from other instrumental
advice, such as classical rhetorical rules. Individual communicators can violate rhetorical rules
(such as “put your strongest argument first, your second strongest last and your weakest in the
middle of a speech”) in order to reach their goal without any notable repercussions. The same
cannot presumable be said of an arguer who violates the ten commandments in order to reach a
resolution of a difference of opinion more effectively. (comp. also van Eemeren and Houtlosser
2015a, pp. 120ff.). If one were to draw a parallel between the realm of communicative
imperatives and ethical imperatives, rhetorical rules could thus be considered the functional
equivalent of act-utilitarian principles and pragma-dialectical rules could be the equivalent of
rule-utilitarianism (see also van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, pp. 187f.). The case of
pragma-dialectics is unfortunately even further complicated by a final aspect. In pointing out that
their rules are not only problem-valid, but also conventionally valid and (up to a point) habitually
used by ordinary arguers (an aspect that has drawn considerable attention in the empirical
research branch of pragma-dialectics; comp. van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, p. 17, p. 22, p.
57, p. 132, p. 134, p. 187; van Eemeren et al. 2014, pp. 573-581; van Eemeren, Meuffels and
Verburg 2000, pp. 416ff.; van Eemeren, Garssen and Meuffels 2007, pp. 367ff.; van Eemeren,
Garssen and Meuffels 2009, pp. 51ff.; van Eemeren, Garssen and Meuffels 2015a, pp. 757ff; van
Eemeren, Garssen and Meuffels 2012a pp. 33ff. / 2015b, pp. 771ff.; van Eemeren, Garssen and
6

As observed in the case of Grice above it is of course dangerous to put too much weight on these kinds of
figurative or ironic references.
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Meuffels 2015c, pp. 793ff., Garssen 2008, pp. 66ff.) van Eemeren and his team treat them at
least partially as level 1 rules that describe normal communicative reality. This aspect does not
seem to be the dominant quality of the pragma-dialectical system however.7
3. The choice of representative rules and disclaimers
Distinguishing between the three levels of communicative rules above, now allows us to address
the question of choosing the right set of rules representing reasonableness and politeness for the
purpose of analyzing their potential areas of conflict. Two aspects are of primary importance for
this choice: 1) the level of the rule set, and 2) the representativeness and theoretical
sophistication of the model for the field.
It is clear from the above outline that only models that broadly fall into the level 2 or
level 3 groups are of interest for the present purpose, because, only these can create a conflict for
a communicator who is trying to reach a particular goal or follow a normative code. Conflicts
between level 1 rules can not create a problem for practical communicators. At best they can be a
challenge for the communication analyst who needs to embed additional aspects in his or her
model. Because level 1 rules describe how communicators do in practice act, rather than how
they should act, their conflict (where it is possible at all) describes a theoretical deficit in a
communication model, not a set of incompatible practical imperatives.
The guiding question of this paper (Under what conditions can norms of politeness and
norms of reasonableness conflict, and what options do individual communicators have to avoid,
minimize or resolve these conflicts?) would principally allow the exemplary analysis of any set
of two norms of reasonableness and politeness that are available. One might argue however, that
the practical relevance of this analysis is significantly influenced by representativeness and
quality of the chosen models. If the models in question only poorly represent the ideas of
politeness and reasonableness or have long been discredited, then showing yet another problem
in their practical usage might be futile, and lead to a straw man fallacy against the respective
discipline. Accordingly, I will briefly justify my choice of both models in the light of the first
restraint above.
Since its beginning in the early 1970s politeness theory has become a vibrant academic
field with its own journal, thousands of scholarly works (Watts already lists more than a
thousand in 2003, Watts 2003, p. xi) and more than a dozen influential theories and models. The
key figures of politeness studies, including Robin Lakoff (1973, 1989, 2005, also Lakoff and Ide
2005), Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson (1978 and 1987, also Brown 2001), Geoffrey
Leech (1983), Yueguo Gu (1990), Sachiko Ide (1982 and 1989), Bruce Fraser and William
Nolen (1981, also Fraser 1990 and 2005), Watts (1989, 1992, 2003), Gino Eelen (2001), Sara
Mills (2003), Miriam Locher (2004, also Locher and Watts 2005), and Dániel Kádár and
Michael Haugh (2013, also Haugh 2014) each left a distinctive mark on the field, and many of
the produced alternative politeness models that could be used.8 Of these arguably the most
famous and most influential are Lakoff’s pioneering work (1973) that drew attention to the field,
Brown and Levinson’s Gricean approach that put the Goffman’s concept of “face” (Goffman
See for example van Eemeren, Garssen and Meuffels’ explicit clarification (2015a, p. 757): “[The extended
pragma-dialectical argumentation theory] is not an empirical model of the various ways in which ordinary arguers
try to achieve effective persuasion within the boundaries of dialectical rationality.”
8
A historical overview over recent developments in politeness theory can be found in Eelen (2001, pp. 1-20), Watts
(2005, pp. xi-xlvii), Hoppmann (2008, pp. 826-836) and Leech (2014, pp. 32-43).
7
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1967) and so-called “face threatening acts / FTAs” at its center, and Leech’s equally Gricean
model of six maxims (1983). These three (groups of) authors also happen to be the only ones that
offer clear models of politeness that aspire to universal validity and which are formulated in the
form of level 2 rules. In the case of Lakoff these are three general rules, Brown and Levinson
offer 40 strategies of how to deal with face threatening acts and five main categories of FTA
interaction, and Leech postulates a politeness principle (PP) parallel to Grice’s cooperative
principle (CP), broken down into six maxims. The more recent studies of politeness shift their
attention away from formulating universal models with level 2 rules and onto criticism of the
early three, the focus on one particular aspect of politeness (gender, culture, impoliteness, etc.) or
empirical studies of polite behavior. Of the three, Lakoff’s model is not sufficiently detailed (or
influential) for the present paper. Brown and Levinson’s model is a tempting candidate, given its
huge influence on the field, but also the strikingly easy juxtaposition of its “strategies” (e.g.
strategy II, 6: “Avoid disagreement”, pp. 113ff., strategy IV, 7 “Use contradictions”, p. 221, or
strategy IV, 11 “Be ambiguous”, p. 225) to rules of reasonableness. At the same time, it is also
one of the most heavily criticized and probably slightly outdated model. In this paper I will use
Leech’s work which is not only one of the pioneering models, but also, one of the most recently
updated theories. His 2014 model presents the far most modern theory of scale that is formulated
in level 2 rules. His own positioning of the politeness principle to Grice’s cooperative principle
(which as observed above is a level 1 rule set that would make Leech’s model also a level 1 rule
set, thereby disqualifying it for the present purposes) is a challenge. This challenge can be briefly
addressed in two points: First, as Huang observed (Huang 2007, pp. 37ff.; similar Hoppmann
2008, pp. 831f.) the parallel position of the PP and CP is theoretically highly doubtful (a critique
that Leech explicitly addresses, but IMHO does not ultimately answer, Leech 2014, p. 86).
Second, even if, the PP partially function as a level 1 rule, its ten maxims (in the 2014 version)
can certainly also be read as an instrumental advice for the practical communicator who strives
to be polite.
Compared to the choice of representative politeness model, the selection of its
counterpart in argumentation theory is relatively trivial. The pragma-dialectical model of the
critical discussion has been so hugely influential in recent argumentation theory, that it far
overshadows potential alternatives in earlier formal dialectics, or more recent other branches of
normative pragmatics or informal logic. Within pragma-dialectics the “ten commandments”
seem to be more appropriate for the present purpose than the “fifteen rules”, due to: their
stronger focus on the practical communicator, their more normative formulation, and their
greater simplicity and economy. This choice is of course ultimately of little relevance as the
content of both sets of rules is theoretically equivalent.
Given the structure of the fields involved one final paragraph on methodological question
seems in order. The pragma-dialectical model has been studied with an extreme level of
sophistication, and work on its varying aspects, fields, perspectives, realms etc. are legion.
Modern works on politeness theory frequently consist of more than fifty percent criticism of
earlier oversimplifications, terminological and methodological clarifications, procedural
disclaimer and limitations, and the like. In the context of the present paper, even enumerating (let
alone addressing or replicating) these disclaimers would more than double its size. I will
therefore limit myself to a meta-disclaimer: Yes, there are many limitations in the scope and
representativeness of the models and the aspects discussed (regarding the Anglo-centric nature of
Leech’s model, gender, class and culture variations of polite behavior, the differences between
non-polite and impolite behavior, the scalar nature of politeness, the phenomenon of over-
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politeness etc. pp.), but these limitations should not distract from the fascinating question at
hand: what happens when communicative norms clash?
4. Interaction of competing communicative norms
Any set of communicative imperatives can interact with another in a variety of ways. Three
aspects of this field of potential interactions are particularly noteworthy: 1) the influence of
permissiveness and prescriptiveness of rules on rule set interaction, 2) the difference between
minimum fulfillments of rule requirements and their ideal maximization, and 3) the graph of
potential rule interaction in communicative behaviors.
When looking at the interaction of communicative rule sets, it is important to distinguish
between permissive and prescriptive rules. Permissive rules (‘may’, ‘do not have to’) of one rule
set cannot clash with other (permissive or prescriptive) rules of the same or a different set. Their
spirit may well be in conflict with other rules (e.g. of a rule of “Discussant may always challenge
each others opinions” with another “S must avoid challenging the opinion of O.”), but by
following the prescriptive rule the communicator can – strictly speaking – avoid breaking either
imperative. This might nevertheless lead to contra productive effects for the aim for which the
specified rule was instrumental. Prescriptive rules (‘must’, ‘may not’) on the other hand are more
prone to produce inter-set conflicts. When analyzing the interaction between any two sets of
communicative rules, prescriptive rules are therefore of principle interest.
Beyond the distinction between permissive and prescriptive groups, communicative rules
can also be differentiated based on their absolute or scalar quality. While some rules ban, permit
or prescribe a particular (more or less precisely defined) communicative behavior, others instruct
the communicator to strive for a particular ideal or to maximize a certain aspect. Of the sets in
question, the pragma-dialectical rules fall mostly into the former class,9 whereas Leech’s maxims
occupy a curious position in this regard. While ostensibly mostly similar in content, the 1983
version of his maxims is phrased in the latter form (e.g. “Agreement maxim: Minimize
disagreement between self and other; maximize agreement between self and other”, Leech 1983,
p. 132),10 whereas the 2014 version is phrased in the former form (e.g. “(M7) Give high value to
O’s opinions (Agreement maxim)”, Leech 2014, p. 96), but the explanation of the rules
maintains a spirit of maximization. With regards to the potential areas of conflict, this distinction
is important, because maximization rules give rise to the danger of creating straw men or near
straw men by contrasting utopic maxima rather than realistically attainable optima. This is
particularly evident for rules such as Brown and Levinson’s. If one was to understand their “Be
vague” strategy (1987, p. 226) as an appeal to maximize vagueness in communication for
example, then just about any argumentative rule might easily clash with this norm.
Finally, it is important to note that any interaction between two sets of communicative
norms produce a two-dimensional graph with four quadrants, each of which may be interesting
for different purposes. Communicative behavior in the tension of reasonableness and politeness
can thus always be portrayed on the following graph:
Although the pragma-dialectical model refers to the “ideal” of a critical discussion, van Eemeren & Grootendorst
make it very clear (e.g. van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, pp. 187ff.) that they are to be understood as simple
first order rules that work as “well-defined guidelines”, not “striving for an unattainable utopia” (2004, p. 188).
Beyond that the semantic structure of the rules and the commandments in very clear in that regard.
10
Leech (1983, p. 132) clarifies that this phrasing is shorthand for “Minimize the expression of beliefs which
express or imply [disagreement between self and other]”, but this explanation is of no consequence for the point at
hand.
9

7

MICHAEL J HOPPMANN

II
Reasonable &
Impolite

I
Reasonable &
Polite

III
Unreasonable
& Impolite

IV
Unreasonable
& Polite

Figure 1: The four quadrants of polite and reasonable communicative behavior
For the present purpose quadrants II and IV are of particular interest. For other studies, quadrants
I and III might be the most important, for example when trying to analyze level 1 rule behavior
of participants in an empirical study, and whether their perception of a communicative act as
problematic is based on their understanding of reasonableness or politeness. (e.g. van Eemeren,
Garssen and Meuffels 2007, pp. 371f.; van Eemeren, Garssen and Meuffels 2009, pp. 70ff.).
5. Politeness according to Leech vs reasonableness according to Pragma-Dialectics
One important quality that Leech’s maxims and the ten commandments of the pragma-dialectical
school have in common is that they both constitute first-order conditions for achieving their
goals (maintaining communicative concord and solving differences of opinion in a reasonable
way respectively). While conflicts between first-order conditions of competing communicative
norm sets are the most tangible and presumably open to the clearest analyses, second-order and
third-order conditions are certainly capable of clashing as well, and even likely to do so in the
case of politeness and reasonableness (comp. Barth and Krabbe 1982, p. 75; van Eemeren et al.
1993, pp. 30-34; van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, pp. 187-190). The ideal mindset for
preserving communicative concord is likely to be different from those who strive to solve a
difference of opinion on its merits; and attempting to attain one, might occasionally conflict with
attaining the other. Similarly, ideal societal conditions for communicating politely are probably
at least partially different from their critical argumentative counterpart. For the present purposes
I will focus on exemplifying some of the areas of potential conflict in the first-order conditions,
being well aware that even this field is already too large to be satisfactorily covered in a single
paper.
In his most recent explanation of the politeness principle Geoffrey Leech provides a list
of ten maxims with their respective brief imperative summary as follows (Leech 2014, pp. 90-98;
comp. also Leech 2007, pp. 182-189):
M1.
M2.

Generosity: Give a high value to O’s wants
Tact: Give a low value to S’ wants
8
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M3.
M4.
M5.
M6.
M7.
M8.
M9.
M10.

Approbation: Give a high value to O’s qualities
Modesty: Give a low value to S’s qualities
Obligation (of S to O): Give a high value to S’s obligation to O
Obligation (of O to S): Give a low value to O’s obligation to S
Agreement: Give a high value to O’s opinions
Opinion reticence: Give a low value to S’s opinions
Sympathy: Give a high value to O’s feelings
Feeling reticence: Give a low value to S’s feelings

Leech observes that these maxims can under certain conditions lead to intra-set conflicts, for
example when two communicators argue over who should pay the bill in a restaurant (politeness
here may mandate to violate the agreement maxim in favor of following the generosity maxim).
These cases are interesting, but for the present purposes relatively trivial, as they can usually be
solved based on additional pragmatic knowledge and cultural preferences, as aptly illustrated by
Leech himself (Leech 2014, pp. 101-103).
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst offer an introduction and detailed explanation of their
code of conduct for reasonable discussants centered around their ten commandments in A
Systematic Theory of Argumentation (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, pp. 187-196). Van
Eemeren and his team also provide an overview of how the rules of the critical discussion can be
broken by practical communicators in a later work (van Eemeren et al. 2014, pp. 544-552). In the
2004 version the ten commandments are stated as follows (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004,
pp. 190-196):
1. Freedom rule: Discussants may not prevent each other from advancing
standpoints or from calling standpoints into question.
2. Obligation-to-defend rule: Discussants who advance a standpoint may not
refuse to defend this standpoint when requested to do so.
3. Standpoint rule: Attacks on standpoints may not bear on a standpoint that has
not actually been put forward by the other party.
4. Relevance rule: Standpoints may not be defended by non-argumentation or
argumentation that is not relevant to the standpoint.
5. Unexpressed-premise rule: Discussants may not falsely attribute unexpressed
premises to the other party, nor disown responsibility for their own
unexpressed premises.
6. Starting-point rule: Discussants may not falsely present something as an
accepted starting point or falsely deny that something is an accepted starting
point.
7. Validity rule: Reasoning that in an argumentation is presented as formally
conclusive may not be invalid in a logical sense.
8. Argument scheme rule: Standpoints may not be regarded as conclusively
defended by argumentation that is not presented as based on formally
conclusive reasoning if the defense does not take place by means of
appropriate argument schemes that are applied correctly.
9. Concluding rule: Inconclusive defenses of standpoints may not lead to
maintaining these standpoints, and conclusive defenses of standpoints may not
lead to maintaining expressions of doubt concerning these standpoints.
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10. Language use rule: Discussants may not use any formulations that are
insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous, and they may not deliberately
misinterpret the other party’s formulations.
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Figure 2: Areas of interaction of pragma-dialectical rules and Leech’s maxims
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C10: Language use
rule

C5: Unexpressedpremise rule
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C8: Argument
scheme rule

C4: Relevance rule
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C2: Obligation-todefend rule

M1: Generosity

C1: Freedom rule

C3: Standpoint rule

C9: Concluding rule

Compared to Leech’s maxims, in the pragma-dialectical system it is harder to see, under what
conditions these commandments could internally conflict with each other, and I am not aware of
the existence of any previous work on this question. For the present purposes it will be safe to
assume that (as in Leech) intra-set conflict is not an essential problem.
Contrasting the two sets of communicative rules with each other produces the following
table. Each of the cells (or groups of cells) in this table indicates a potential area of conflict
between imperatives of politeness and reasonableness, as understood by Leech and PragmaDialectics. In the final part of this analysis I will draw attention to a select few of these areas. It
goes without saying that this selection makes no claim to completeness, although a full analysis
of all areas of conflict would be an academic desideratum. For ease of reference each cell is
numbered.
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Leech’s treatment of his maxims (both in 2007 and 2014) does not offer the same preciseness as
the pragma-dialectical rules, and beyond his actual phrasing of the maxims he relies mostly on
examples to specify them. Nevertheless, there are a couple of relationships between maxims and
commandments that seem to carry a high potential for conflict in practical communication. These
include: a) cells 31 & 71, b) cells 22, 62, and 20, c) cells 78, 79, 88, and 89. These are just
interesting examples, and far from an exhaustive list. Exhaustiveness at this stage is not only
prevented by the scope of this paper, but also by the fact that (in opposition to the pragmadialectical rules), Leech explicitly does not claim completeness of his maxims, although one can
be reasonably safe in assuming that he has been striving for at least approaching completeness in
the three decades of working on and expanding his model (comp. Leech 2014, 98).
Taking a look at the table above, it does not come as a surprise that potential conflicts in
some regions of the table are easier to identify than in others. Maxims 9 and 10 for example deal
primarily with the communicators’ feelings and are easier to satisfy in a critical discussion than
those dealing with clarity and obligations.
Let us now take a closer look at the three groups of cells and areas of potential conflict
mentioned above:
a) Cells 31 & 71
At face value neither the approbation maxim (Give a high value to O’s qualities) nor the
agreement maxim (Give a high value to O’s opinions) seems to clash with the freedom rule
(Discussants may not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or from calling standpoints
into question). On the contrary, paying a high communicative respect to one’s interlocutor seems
even to encourage keeping in line with the freedom rule. This perspective however, ignores that
the purpose of installing this rule is to prevent the exclusion of new standpoints and criticism that
may be instrumental for the further development of the resolution of the difference of opinion.
Such a prevention cannot just come from the conversational antagonist11 (O in Leech’s
terminology), but also from the protagonist (S). Maxims 3 and 7 strongly suggest such
prevention and thus call for self-censorship that undermines the goals of a critical discussion.
b) Cells 22, 62, and 20
The two maxims of tact (Give a low value to S’ wants) and obligation of O to S (Give a low
value to O’s obligation to S) stand at a similar tension to the obligation-to-defend rule
(Discussants who advance a standpoint may not refuse to defend this standpoint when requested
to do so) as approbation and agreement to the freedom rule above. Once again at face value there
is no clash. The protagonist can maintain a high level of deference to the antagonist while
maintaining his or her argumentative obligations. But once again, the purpose of this
commandment is also undermined by the two maxims inasmuch as they require the protagonist
to refrain from requesting a defense. Leech explains the tact maxim as follows: “For example,
requests are often indirect, tentative, giving an opportunity to refuse, and also softening, or
mitigating, S’s imposition on H” (Leech 2014, p. 93). It is this softening and invitation to refuse
a request that runs counter to the purpose of the obligation-to-defend rule. A similar effect can be
observed for cell 20. The indirectness and tentativeness demanded by the tact maxim can easily
get into conflict with the clarity and unambiguity demanded by the language use rule
(Discussants may not use any formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly
ambiguous, and they may not deliberately misinterpret the other party’s formulations.)
I have to take a liberty with the terms “protagonist” and “antagonist” for the purposes of this discussion. They are
here primarily meant to refer to party A (e.g. the party that requests a clarification) and party B (e.g. the party that
provides this clarification). I believe that this wording is clearer that available alternatives.
11
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c) Cells 78, 79, 88, and 89
The final group to be addressed here contains the cells that stand at the intersection of the two
opinion maxims, agreement (Give a high value to O’s opinions) and opinion reticence (Give a
low value to S’s opinions), with the argument scheme rule (Standpoints may not be regarded as
conclusively defended by argumentation that is not presented as based on formally conclusive
reasoning, if the defense does not take place by means of appropriate argument schemes that are
applied correctly) and the concluding rule (Inconclusive defenses of standpoints may not lead to
maintaining these standpoints, and conclusive defenses of standpoints may not lead to
maintaining expressions of doubt concerning these standpoints). The two opinion maxims
instruct the communicator to minimize the disagreement with his or her interlocutor. In Leech’s
words: “In responding to other’s opinions or judgments, agreement is the preferred response and
disagreement is dispreferred” (Leech 2014, p. 96) and “In other cases, S consults H’s opinion,
deferring to H’s supposed greater understanding, wisdom, or experience” (Leech 2014, p. 97).
This deference creates a communicative asymmetry that is harmful for cooperatively judging the
value of an argument or argumentation on its merits as required by the eights and ninth
commandment.
Beyond these observations on the presence of some potential areas of conflict between
Leech’s maxims and the pragma-dialectical commandments, a final note on the absence of other
is in order. As noted above, while Leech’s model seems to be the best representative of modern
politeness norms, contrasting the rules of the critical discussion with Brown and Levinson’s
model would have let to more stark results. Many of their “off record” strategies such as “Use
contradictions”, “Be ambiguous”, “Be vague”, or “Be incomplete", "use ellipsis”, encourage one
form of ambiguity or the other, and stand in contradictory opposition to the tenth commandment.
Ambiguity, while multiple times being hinted at, is not one of the explicit maxims of Leech.
6. Dealing with potential areas of inter-norm conflict
In the last section of this paper I want to briefly look at the options of a communicator when
confronted with a potential conflict between: competing communicative norms in general, and
the imperatives of politeness and reasonableness in particular. These remarks will take the form
of a cursory outlook rather than a detailed analysis.12
The evident first option of polite and reasonable communicators is to minimize the
conflict when or before it arises. The main strategy for this option is the abovementioned
prioritization of prescriptive over permissive rules. While this strategy severely reduces the
liberty of the communicator (now following two sets of prescriptive rules and their limitations
rather than one set of prescriptive and permissive rules), it also significantly reduces the area of
potential conflict of first-order conditions. As observed above, this strategy might come at the
price of defeating some of the aims of the rules.
The second – and just as evident – option of the communicator at this tension is the
prioritization of his or her communicative goals. If the serving two lords at the same time leads
to contradictory orders, one is well advised to declare primary loyalty to one camp. However, in
practice this choice might come at a high price and even ultimately undermine some of the
purpose of the preferred goal. An overt lack of politeness might be harmful for the aim of
12

The nature of this question is similar to that of how to respond to a fallacy in a practical discussion. Unfortunately,
the options that are available then, such as initiating a meta-dialogue or an apparent counter-fallacy (van Eemeren
and Houtlosser 2015c, pp. 635-639), are no options in the present dilemma.
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cooperatively spirited critical discussion and an unreasonable display of politeness might appear
as obsequiousness rather than civility.
Third, in the presence of an audience and with an ultimate rhetorical goal in mind, a
communicator might choose to outsource some of his or her choices to the (anticipated or
observed) preferences of that audience. In the public sphere the conflict between behaving
communicatively polite or reasonable will often ultimately boil down to the desire of being
perceived as behaving polite or reasonable. If this is the case then the priority of the norms is not
an intrinsic or agent driven question, but one of audience preference. On the larger scheme of
things and in the metaphor above this of course ultimately amounts to declaring allegiance to
neither of the lords of politeness or of reasonableness, but to the overlord of persuasion.
The final potential option comes in the form of an open question: Is it possible to
explicitly address a conflict between the imperatives of politeness and reasonableness in a
practical conversation? Or, to be more precise: Can it be productive to do so? Of course there are
frequent examples of communicators explicitly addressing this conflict “Civility prevents me
from stating my opinion on your standpoint, sir!”, but most of these seem to make little
contribution to either the politeness or the reasonableness of the discourse, but rather are
employed as stylistic devices. In the area of the rhetorical analysis of an inter-norm conflict
between legal, moral or religious norm systems (i.e. stasis theory), justifying breaking one rule
set with reference to the prescriptive demands of another rule set is known as equity defense: Is
there an equity defense for being impolite or unreasonable?
7. Conclusion
Of course no one needs to be outright rude to be reasonable, nor does anyone need to be
foolishly inconsistent in order to be polite, but politeness and reasonableness stand in a
relationship of tension when applied to practical communication. In this paper I have tried to
shed some light onto this tension by: taking a closer look at three distinct levels of
communicative rules and how they can clash with each other, selecting two sets of representative
rules (Leech’s ten maxims for politeness and the pragma-dialectical rules for reasonableness),
and identifying how the first-order conditions expressed in these rule sets can contradict each
other or the aims for which they are instrumental. I have paid particular attention to three
exemplary areas of inter-norm conflict and briefly addressed how communicators that are caught
up in these conflicts can deal with them.
The maxims of politeness are not the only communicative rules that can conflict with the
norms of reasonableness. The imperatives that can be generated to guide communicators who are
trying to be persuasive, funny, flirtatious or ironic – too name just a few – can similarly generate
a tension with the imperatives of reasonableness. Analyzing their interaction with the pragmadialectical rules could be a valuable contribution to our understanding of the limits of
reasonableness.
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